Who Plays the Militant Card When the BNP Is in Power?

Who Plays the Militant Card When the BNP Is in Power?

On 30 July, a pressure cooker bomb was recovered in Ashulia. On 24 July, a pipe bomb concealed inside an umbrella was found beneath Motijheel Metro Rail Station. Both devices were left in crowded public places by unidentified individuals. Both were discovered before they could explode. The election is over, and the BNP is now in power. Yet it is at precisely this moment that such incidents are occurring.

The obvious question is: Who plays the militant card when the BNP is in power?

Many still remember 2005. At the time, the BNP–Jamaat coalition government was in office under Prime Minister Khaleda Zia. On 17 August 2005, nearly 500 bombs exploded across 63 districts within just half an hour. Jama'atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) claimed responsibility. Courts, government buildings, and public places were targeted, while leaflets calling for Islamic rule were distributed. Although the death toll was relatively limited, the attacks spread fear across the country.

The same question arose then. How could such a large-scale militant campaign take place while the BNP was in power? Some argued that it reflected a failure of the government. Others suggested it was a calculated attempt to put the government under pressure. At the time, the Awami League was the main opposition party and accused the government of failing to maintain law and order.

Looking at today's situation, it appears that history may be repeating itself.

Could the defeated and ousted Awami League now be reverting to the same old strategy? Is it trying to portray Bangladesh as unstable under the new government by creating the impression of renewed militant activity? Is the objective to convince both the public and the international community that security deteriorates whenever the BNP governs?

Or is the reality even more complex? Could a foreign power or a regional interest group be seeking to exploit Bangladesh's internal politics by creating confusion and instability?

Similar questions were raised in 2005. Even then, some argued that militant violence might not simply reflect government failure but could also involve deliberate provocation by political rivals or external actors. Those same questions have resurfaced today.

Constructing a pressure cooker bomb or an umbrella IED is not a simple task. It requires technical expertise, access to materials, and careful planning. Choosing crowded public places and sensitive moments suggests that the objective may extend beyond causing casualties. It may also be intended to spread fear and expose perceived weaknesses in the government's security apparatus.

If militant or terrorist incidents repeatedly occur while the BNP is in office, who stands to benefit the most? Those who seek to portray the government as ineffective. Those who want to undermine public confidence. Those who wish to damage Bangladesh's image in the eyes of the international community.

The new government's greatest challenge is to identify those responsible through a swift, credible, and transparent investigation. Otherwise, an old narrative may once again gain momentum—that militant activity inevitably rises whenever the BNP is in power.

The question therefore remains, just as it did in 2005: Who plays the militant card when the BNP is in power? Is it the defeated and ousted Awami League? Or are foreign actors operating from the shadows? Until those responsible are identified and their motives established, suspicion and uncertainty will continue to linger.