Global Terrorism Index 2026: India 13th, Bangladesh 42nd—Yet the Finger Is Pointed at the Neighbor

 Global Terrorism Index 2026: India 13th, Bangladesh 42nd—Yet the Finger Is Pointed at the Neighbor

India’s long-standing political narrative about neighboring Bangladesh has once again come under renewed scrutiny. The South Asian picture presented by the Global Terrorism Index, or GTI 2026, is one such example. According to the index published by the Institute for Economics & Peace, Pakistan is the country most affected by terrorism in the world, ranking among 163 countries with a score of 8.574. Afghanistan ranks 11th, while India ranks 13th with a score of 6.428. Bangladesh, meanwhile, ranks 42nd, with a score of only 2.286.

The main issue here is not merely the ranking; rather, it is what the index actually measures. The GTI does not determine “who is a terrorist” based on a country’s political position, religious identity, or statements made by any government. The index evaluates the real impact of terrorism—including the number of attacks, deaths and injuries, and hostage-taking incidents—through a five-year weighted average. And this index clearly shows that India ranks 13th while Bangladesh ranks 42nd. Yet India repeatedly points the finger at Bangladesh over militancy. Now, rather than viewing this as a political slogan, it would be more reasonable to see it as an opportunity to compare the security situations of the two countries using an internationally recognized measure.

The data for 2025 is even more significant. The GTI says that the number of terrorist attacks in Bangladesh decreased by 100 percent compared with the previous year, while in India it decreased by only 43 percent. During the same period, the total number of terrorist attacks in South Asia declined by 13.4 percent, while deaths caused by terrorism decreased by nearly 4 percent. In other words, the region has not become completely free of terrorism, but the degree of improvement in Bangladesh was much greater than in India.

So the question lies elsewhere: when the political narrative surrounding security concerns over Bangladesh is repeatedly brought to the forefront, what does this international data tell us? Border tensions, illegal infiltration, extremism, or security concerns are certainly legitimate state concerns. But concern and evidence are not the same thing. If a neighboring state is to be regularly portrayed as a security threat, there must also be strong evidence to support that portrayal. The latest GTI results at least indicate that, in terms of the impact of terrorism in 2025, Bangladesh was far below India.

More importantly, this index has held up a mirror to India. A lower score for Bangladesh does not mean that the country is now free from the risk of terrorism compared with India. India’s 13th position does not mean that India is an unstable state—this cannot simply be concluded by looking at the GTI index. This information is a mirror: terrorism is a regional problem, and addressing it requires mutual cooperation, intelligence sharing, and border security. But how much diplomatic etiquette is involved in pointing a finger at others while keeping dirt on one’s own backside is something India itself should understand.

Therefore, the question should not be “who will blame whom,” but rather, “who has what evidence?” It is easy to look at a neighbor with suspicion at every turn, but when an international index presents a relatively different picture, it is also important to question that narrative.

Before presenting Bangladesh as a symbol of security risk, India should also bring the realities of terrorism within its own country into the discussion. Because in the politics of security, the most powerful weapon is not emotion—it is evidence.